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Review
The traditional view of nervous system function postu-
lates that a lesion to the brain will usually lead to a loss of 
function, that a second lesion will inevitably exacerbate 
the effects of the first lesion, that sensory loss will gener-
ally lead to impairment, and that aging is always associ-
ated with functional deficits. These assumptions, however, 
appear in some cases to be incorrect, with implications for 
our understanding of brain-behavior relations and also for 
therapeutic endeavors in clinical settings.
The study of individuals with cerebral pathology has 
traditionally been embedded in the lesion-deficit model. 
Although this framework has provided valuable insights 
into our understanding of the organization of function in 
the human brain, it has its drawbacks. By focusing on the 
negative effects of changes, the lesion-deficit model can 
overlook positive changes, such as plasticity-related phe-
nomena. It can also introduce potential confounds since it 
can sometimes be problematical to make a direct link 
between a behavioral deficit and the locus of a lesion or 
disease state because of other nonspecific or distant 
effects of the lesion. Last, it may discourage thinking 
about the compensatory and adaptive strategies that the 
brain, and the person, could use and which assist in cop-
ing with disease and restoring function.
In this article, we explore examples that question the 
traditional view that lesion or dysfunction of the nervous 
system inevitably leads only to deficits in performance. 
Not only are these examples important clinically, but they 
also have scientific relevance. Science usually advances 
steadily, by convergence, and is wary of maverick theories 
that often capture attention. However, paradoxical phe-
nomena that are outside prevailing models can occasion-
ally illuminate underlying processes, and paradoxical 
behavior even appears to operate at a basic biological level 
such as molecules within cell circuits (Hart and others 
2012). Thinking about exceptions may provide insights 
into how the brain functions, and also into how people who 
experience neurological difficulties may best be helped.
We do not challenge that, for most people, neurologi-
cal impairment reduces their possibilities within the 
world and frequently requires them to relearn functions 
and actions that previously occurred automatically. But 
we do suggest that these losses are not always the only 
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Abstract
Disorders of the brain and its sensory organs have traditionally been associated with deficits in movement, perception, 
cognition, emotion, and behavior. It is increasingly evident, however, that positive phenomena may also occur in such 
conditions, with implications for the individual, science, medicine, and for society. This article provides a selective 
review of such positive phenomena – enhanced function after brain lesions, better-than-normal performance in people 
with sensory loss, creativity associated with neurological disease, and enhanced performance associated with aging. 
We propose that, akin to the well-established field of positive psychology and the emerging field of positive clinical 
psychology, the nascent fields of positive neurology and positive neuropsychology offer new avenues to understand 
brain-behavior relationships, with both theoretical and therapeutic implications.
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outcomes of nervous system insults. Such ideas are not new. 
“Neurology’s favourite word is deficit, denoting an impair-
ment or incapacity of neurological function,” noted Oliver 
Sacks (1985, p. 1). Ten years later, in An Anthropologist on 
Mars, he wrote, “Defects, disorders, diseases, in this sense, 
can play a paradoxical role, by bringing out latent powers, 
developments, evolutions, forms of life, that might never be 
seen, or even be imaginable, in their absence” (Sacks 1995, 
p. xii). As early as 1929, Vygotsky made a similar point in 
“The Fundamental Problems of Defectology,” commenting 
on the importance of compensatory strategies and mecha-
nisms in cases such as blindness (Vygotsky and others 
1929/1993). Vygotsky noted,
The doctrine of overcompensation has an important 
significance and serves as a psychological basis for 
the theory and practice of educating a child with a 
loss of hearing, sight, and so forth. What horizons 
will open up to the pedagogue, when he recognizes 
that a defect is not only a minus, a deficit, or a 
weakness but also a plus, a source of strength and 
that it has some positive implications! (Vygotsky 
and others 1929/1993, p. 29)
Recently, a number of studies have challenged the stan-
dard lesion-deficit model. There may be limited correspon-
dence between lesion and dysfunction or disability 
(Rovaris and Filippi 2005; Savva and others 2009; Strasser-
Fuchs and others 2008), whereas in some instances lesions 
may be clinically “silent” for years (Hakiki and others 
2008; Krampla and others 2008; Kuratsu and others 2000). 
Kapur’s (1996) article on paradoxical functional facilita-
tion helped outline a new framework with which to view 
brain-behavior relationships. In developmental neuropsy-
chology, there has also been a greater recognition of the 
occurrence of enhanced function in conditions such as 
autism (Frith and Happé 2009) and dyslexia (Schneps 
and others 2012; von Károlyi and others 2003).
The field of positive psychology is now well estab-
lished (Baumgardner and Crothers 2009), with journals, 
organizations and government reports devoted to the 
topic. This movement emphasizes the role of disposi-
tional optimism, the neural mechanisms of flourishing, 
and the importance of resilience and functional reserve in 
coping with impairment (Seligman 1999; Seligman and 
Csikszentmihalyi 2000). In parallel, the field of positive 
clinical psychology has recently begun to emerge as a 
distinct entity (Joseph and Wood 2010; Tarrier 2010; 
Wood and Tarrier 2010), which advocates a focus on the 
positive in traits and experiences and incorporates these 
as part of the assessment and treatment process in a thera-
peutic setting.
The focus of this article is somewhat different from 
most papers in clinical neuroscience—our focus is on the 
extent to which various brain conditions, of themselves 
and independent of resilience or optimism, enable and 
uncover enhancement, and how this enhancement may 
reveal brain mechanisms and opportunities for rehabilita-
tion. As was implicit in Hughlings Jackson’s theory of 
recovery of function (York and Steinberg 1995), when con-
fronted with a lesion or illness, the brain responds by 
adapting in a highly plastic fashion, and thus the various 
observable consequences are the manifestations of how the 
rest of the brain copes with the insults. As such, the conse-
quences can be deleterious, beneficial, or show no clinical 
consequences at all—a “silent” lesion. Whereas tradition-
ally only the first and last of these consequences have been 
discussed, we will focus on the second outcome.
To our knowledge, the term positive neurology has 
only been briefly used on a couple of occasions (Chatterjee 
2004; Eide and Eide 2006), and the term positive neuro-
psychology only in a couple of conference presentations 
(Arnett 2011; Eslinger 2005). This review is intended to 
help set a foundation for the fields of positive neurology 
and positive neuropsychology and to illustrate how such 
a foundation may have significant theoretical and thera-
peutic implications.
Enhancement of  
Function after Brain Lesions
In neurological conditions, paradoxical enhancements of 
function generally take one of three forms; enhanced 
performance compared with neurologically intact indi-
viduals (“lesion facilitation”), alleviation or restoration to 
normal following a second brain lesion (“double-hit 
recovery”), and direct or indirect benefit for long-term 
neurological outcome after specific cognitive deficits 
(“paradoxical positive outcome”).
Enhanced Cognitive Performance in 
Neurological Patients (“Lesion Facilitation”)
Better-than-normal performance in neurological patients 
compared to healthy controls has been noted in percep-
tual performance (Fig. 1) in those with visual object 
agnosia (Moscovitch and others 1997), visual search in 
patients with semantic dementia (Viskontas and others 
2011) and detection of deception from facial cues in 
those with aphasia (Etcoff and others 2000).
In the case of amnesic patients, unlike healthy con-
trols, they are less likely to extrapolate beyond the view 
in scenes and consequently make fewer boundary exten-
sion errors (Figures 2 and 3) in their recall of visual 
scenes and tactile arrays (Mullally and others 2012).
In addition, a reduced susceptibility to make false 
positive responses to associates of target items (“lures”) 
has been noted in patients with amnesia (Schacter 1996) 
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Figure 1. The “Faces in the Forest” by Beverely Doolittle. The 
faces are composed of rocks, trees, and streams. The patient 
in the study by Moscovitch and others (1997) was better able 
to detect the faces than healthy controls. © Beverly Dolittle, 
licensed by The Greenwich Workshop, Inc. Reproduced by 
permission.
Figure 2. Boundary extension drawing task. (A) The left panel 
displays the three scene stimuli. Each scene photograph was 
surrounded by a 6 × 6 inch black border and was studied for 
15 seconds and immediately drawn from memory in a 6 × 6 
inch response square. Example drawings by a patient and her 
two matched control participants are displayed in the middle 
and left panels. In both control participants’ drawings, more 
background is clearly depicted than was present in the original 
stimuli. This represents greater boundary extension and was 
quantified in terms of a percentage area decrease in object 
size (calculated by tracing along the outer borders of the 
objects using Adobe Photoshop CS4 and measuring the area 
in pixels) in the remembered relative to the original object 
size. (B) Overall, patients showed significantly less boundary 
extension than control participants. *P < .05. From Mullally 
and others (2012). © 2012 Current Biology Elsevier. Reproduced 
by permission.
and those with Alzheimer’s disease (Hudon and others 
2006). In a learning task where it pays to forget irrele-
vant associations from earlier trials, patients with amne-
sia may indeed do this and thus perform better than 
controls (Myers and others 2003). Where explicit and 
implicit memory mechanisms compete, and implicit 
mechanisms underpin correct responses, then having 
impaired explicit memory—as in the case of amnesia—
may result in better-than-normal performance (Cermak 
and others 1997; Musen and others 1990). Enhanced 
performance in problem-solving tasks has also been 
reported in a few studies of patients with frontal lobe 
lesions (Reverberi and others 2005) and more success-
ful risk-taking behavior in patients with lesions of the 
amygdala or orbitofrontal cortex (Shiv and others 
2005).
Where a Second Brain Lesion Helps 
(“Double-Hit Recovery”)
In films and cartoons (see Baxendale 2004), it is not 
uncommon for somebody to become densely amnesic 
following a bang to the head, only to recover miracu-
lously after a second bump. Although this effect is fic-
tional, there are a few well-documented cases where a 
subsequent lesion may ameliorate deficits caused by the 
first.
In cats, Sprague (1966) produced inattention to the left 
side of space, “left-sided visual neglect,” following abla-
tion of the right posterior neocortex. When this lesion 
was followed by another, this time to the left superior col-
liculus, much of this neglect and related visual deficits 
disappeared. Subsequent studies (summarized in Sprague 
1996 and in Ogourtsova and others 2010) have confirmed 
the effect and have also extended it to the field of auditory 
function (Lomber and others 2007).
Weddell (2004) reported the first clinical case study 
documenting a human analogue of the Sprague effect. A 
patient with a midbrain tumor developed left-sided 
neglect as the result of subsequent right frontal damage. 
When the midbrain tumor progressed to involve the left 
superior colliculus, bilateral visual orientation returned 
(though subsequent right-sided visual neglect developed 
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after further progression of the tumor, with probable 
additional damage to the right superior colliculus). 
Vuilleumier and others (1996) found that left-sided 
neglect following a right parietal infarct disappeared 
after subsequent left frontal infarction. Related to this 
observation are studies that have employed left hemi-
sphere transcranial magnetic stimulation to alleviate 
left-sided neglect (Lim and others 2010; Shindo and 
others 2006).
In the field of movement disorders, a second lesion 
superimposed on existing pathology may restore a degree 
of balance to a system and thus result in alleviation of 
motor symptoms. For example, Probst-Cousin and others 
(2003) and Choi and others (2008) have reported that tha-
lamic stroke can lead to the alleviation of tremor caused 
by Parkinson’s disease.
Paradoxical Positive Outcomes  
in Neurological Disorders
Traumatic brain injury (TBI) generally results in impaired 
functioning in cognition, emotion, and behavior. The 
traumatic event itself can often have negative connota-
tions and, in some patients, posttraumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD) is a major residual disability. PTSD involves 
intrusive thoughts related to the event, including night-
mares, distress on exposure to trauma-related cues, anxi-
ety and avoidance behavior, and general cognitive and 
somatic symptoms associated with hyperarousal. In TBI, 
especially following blunt head injury with concussion, 
there is usually amnesia for the event. Drawing on earlier 
clinical observations (Adler 1943; O’Brien 1993), sev-
eral studies have reported that some patients with TBI 
have a lower incidence of PTSD. Gil and others (2005) 
reported that the less patients recalled of the event associ-
ated with their head injury, the less they developed 
PTSD. Subsequently, Bryant and others (2009) noted that 
longer periods of posttraumatic amnesia seemed to pro-
tect against the occurrence of severe intrusive memories. 
Other studies have, however, not found such a protective 
effect (e.g., Greenspan and others 2006). Harvey and oth-
ers (2003) have noted that some of these differences may 
in part be related to ambiguity in the criteria for diagnos-
ing PTSD and that TBI patients may perhaps have PTSD 
symptoms, but that the symptoms differ in content from 
that of other PTSD patients.
Although insight and an accurate awareness of one’s 
deficit in TBI are important for a good outcome, a few 
anomalies in this relationship have been noted. Thus, 
Herbert and Powell (1989) reported that clients with TBI 
who over-rated their abilities did better following rehabili-
tation than clients who were more realistic or underconfi-
dent (though see Malia and others 1993). More recently, 
Cooper-Evans and others (2008) noted that those with TBI 
who were more impaired cognitively and/or less aware of 
their deficits reported higher-self esteem than other TBI 
survivors. Recently, there has also been an increased focus 
on positive changes seen in some who survive a brain 
injury or brain illness—“posttraumatic growth.” Such 
observations in neurological conditions are surprising 
given the generally negative expectations after an insult to 
the brain. Both McGrath and Linley (2006) and Powell and 
others (2007) noted that in a group with TBI, posttraumatic 
growth appeared to increase with time. Hawley and Joseph 
(2008) followed up cases for an average of 11 years after 
TBI and found that around half of their participants showed 
evidence of posttraumatic growth on a structured question-
naire, responding positively to items such as—“I value my 
relationships much more now.”
Researchers who have investigated people’s experi-
ence of locked-in-syndrome have found a significant 
Figure 3. Haptic boundary extension task. (A) Participants 
explored three distinct scenes, each presented within a 
wooden border (left panel), for 30 seconds using touch 
alone. The border was then removed (upper right panel) 
and participants (still blindfolded) were asked to indicate the 
original location of each border using large markers (right 
lower panel). (B) Boundary extension was defined in terms 
of an increase in the reconstructed scene area relative to 
the original scene’s size. Compared with the control group, 
patients showed significantly less boundary extension. *P < 
.05. From Mullally and others (2012). © 2012 Current Biology 
Elsevier. Reproduced by permission.
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number who maintain a good quality of life and one 
which is often in the same range as age-matched healthy 
individuals (Lulé and others 2009). In that study, depres-
sion was not predicted by physical state; rather, having a 
successful psychological adjustment to the disease was 
related to problem-oriented coping strategies, like seeking 
information, and emotional coping strategies. The stron-
gest predictor of psychosocial adjustment was, in turn, 
perceived social support. Interestingly, Lulé and others 
(2009) also found evidence that significant others, like 
primary caregivers or spouses, rated locked-in-syndrome 
patients’ quality of life significantly lower than the patients 
themselves rated their quality of life.
These examples echo the work of the German neurolo-
gist Kurt Goldstein, based on his observations on soldiers 
with brain injury after World War I (Goldstein 1935/1995). 
He described how some people have a capacity to actively 
adapt and adjust to catastrophic losses. He suggested that 
this involved, among other things, withdrawal to a more 
limited range of functioning and expectations, which 
could, in turn, be managed by a redistribution of reduced 
energies, thus reclaiming as much wholeness and “mean-
ing” as their new circumstances allow. This often involved 
a transformation of identity and a willingness to accept 
change, to become “all that one can become.” He described 
how, using this mental framework, success arose through 
a focus on residual strengths rather than on any negative 
consequences of pathology. In this sense, psychological 
flexibility (or an ability to continually adapt one’s think-
ing, emotions, and behavior) has been put forward as an 
essential buffer throughout life’s “ups and downs” (e.g., 
Kashdan and Rottenberg 2010).
Enhanced Function  
Associated with Sensory Loss
It is hardly conceivable that losing or lacking a sensory 
modality would not, in some fashion, alter the capacities 
of processing, understanding, or interacting with the 
world. Therefore, if lack or loss of a sensory modality 
leads to a compensatory enhancement of other senses, 
resulting in minimal loss or even functional gains, these 
would represent instances of paradoxical functional facil-
itation. Enhancement of functioning in people with 
chronic or recent sensory loss has been widely studied. 
Individuals with visual loss have been found to show 
enhanced sensory performance in other domains. Simi- 
larly, long-term auditory loss has been associated with 
enhanced cognitive performance in tactile and visual 
tasks. Functional brain imaging and transcranial magnetic 
stimulation studies have pointed to a major reorganization 
of cerebral function in blind or deaf individuals, and these 
plastic changes are associated with functional adaptations 
and gains.
Loss of Vision
Individuals with visual loss have been found to show 
enhanced auditory function, tactile function and even verbal 
memory performance (Amedi and others 2003; Collignon 
and others 2006; Forster and others 2007; Kupers and Ptito 
2011). Rosenbluth and others (2000) and, more recently, 
Cuevas and others (2009) found that children with early-
onset or congenital blindness perform better than sighted 
children at labeling common odors. Beaulieu-Lefebvre 
and others (2011) showed that blind individuals had signifi-
cantly lower odor detection thresholds than sighted 
individuals, and a study from the same group (Kupers 
and others, 2011) showed stronger blood oxygen level–
dependent responses in the occipital cortex when blind 
participants were performing an odor detection task. 
Hugdahl and others (2004) found that blind subjects are bet-
ter than sighted subjects at repeating spoken syllables.
Gougoux and others (2004) also reported better pitch 
discrimination in early-blind, but not late-blind, subjects. 
Along with many others, Fieger and others (2006) 
reported that blind individuals are also better than sighted 
individuals in the localization of sounds, particularly 
those coming from the periphery. Collignon and others 
(2006) reported shorter reaction times in auditory and 
tactile spatial attention tasks in the early blind, who also 
show better divided attention in tests where both tactile 
and auditory modalities are used. In addition, Stevens and 
Weaver (2005) have found that early-blind subjects have 
lower temporal order judgment thresholds than sighted 
subjects in auditory tasks. Recent evidence further sug-
gests that enhanced auditory capabilities may facilitate 
faster emotional discrimination in blind individuals than 
controls (Klinge and others 2010).
In the case of haptic sensitivity, Van Boven and others 
(2000) and Goldreich and Kanics (2003) have found that 
early-blind subjects show enhanced tactile discrimination 
in a gratings orientation task. This task evaluates an indi-
vidual’s tactile discrimination ability in judging fine ori-
entation differences between objects. Blind subjects also 
demonstrated lower thresholds on an angle discrimina-
tion task compared with sighted subjects, providing fur-
ther evidence of a heightened sensitivity to tactile inputs 
(Alary and others 2008). Forster and others (2007) found 
that the blind respond faster and are more accurate than 
sighted subjects in a difficult tactile spatial selection task. 
Röder and others (2004) noted better tactile temporal 
order judgments in the congenitally blind (Occelli and 
others 2008; Wan and others 2009). Enhanced perfor-
mance by blind subjects in detecting Braille characters 
has been noted in a number of studies—for example, 
Bliss and others (2004) reported that in a tactile n-back 
task (in which people are asked to judge whether a cur-
rent stimulus differs from that presented 1, 2, . . ., n trials 
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previously), blind subjects outperformed their sighted 
counterparts. Blind individuals also show greater accu-
racy than sighted individuals in bimanual tactile estima-
tions of object size with familiar objects (Smith and others 
2005). Champoux and others (2011) found that blind indi-
viduals were less susceptible to the parchment-skin illu-
sion, in which the sound generated by hands rubbing 
together results in a change in how dry or moist the palms 
feel, depending on how the original sound is altered (e.g., 
change in frequency). It seemed that blind individuals are 
better at ignoring auditory stimuli while completing a tac-
tile task. Interestingly, enhanced tactile abilities do not 
appear to be limited to the fingers used for Braille; some 
reports have also found greater tactile discrimination abil-
ity in the tongue in blind individuals (Chebat and others 
2007), though others have reported enhancement effects 
on the fingers but not on the lips (Wong and others 2011), 
suggesting that it is training experience rather than visual 
deprivation that may be the key factor (Voss, 2011). 
However, not all aspects of haptic processing are enhanced 
in the blind—for example, tactile spatial judgment may be 
comparable in performance to that of healthy individuals 
(Sathian and Stilla 2010).
There is also evidence for enhanced memory func-
tioning in blind individuals. People who are blind have 
been reported to outperform the sighted in auditory–
verbal recognition (Röder and others 2001), recall 
(Amedi and others 2003), and memory for the ordering 
of a heard list (Raz and others 2007). In all domains, 
however, the specifics of the task appear to determine 
whether functional gains will be observed (Alary and 
others 2009). Recent data suggest that the advantage in 
blind individuals stems from better stimulus encoding 
rather than enhancements in later stages of processing 
(Rokem and Ahissar 2009).
Since ancient times, people who are blind have been 
taught to sing, and anecdotes abound about disproportion-
ate numbers having musical talent. Examining one aspect 
of musicality, the ability to precisely name a heard note 
(“absolute pitch”), Hamilton and others (2004) found that 
57.1% of blind musicians possessed this talent. In con-
trast, the highest reported rates among sighted Caucasian 
musicians is 18%. Since all the blind musicians in the 
study were rendered blind by peripheral causes after birth, 
this heightened prevalence appears related to the conse-
quences, rather than the causes, of sight loss. There are 
intriguing suggestions that the acquisition and mechanisms 
of absolute pitch may differ in blind musicians. First, the 
age of initial music exposure among the blind (average 
8.45 years; range = 3-24 years) was significantly later than 
that among sighted, absolute pitch musicians (average = 
5.06 years; range = 3-7 years). Second, in brain imaging 
studies, blind musicians with absolute pitch did not show 
the same exaggerated planum temporale asymmetry as 
was observed on the brain imaging in their sighted 
counterparts.
Valentine Haüy, known as the “father and apostle of 
the blind,” and many subsequent educators have argued 
for an enhanced ability among blind children to learn 
music and this ability, in addition to barriers in other pro-
fessions, may account for the prevalence of piano-tuners 
in this community. It is worth noting, however, that the 
idea that blind people are obliged to learn lengthy sec-
tions of music “by ear” is wrong; Louis Braille, himself 
an accomplished musician, adapted his punctographic 
system to musical notation.
Loss of Hearing
Paradoxical phenomena have also been shown in the 
domain of auditory loss. Levanen and Hamdorf (2001) 
reported that congenitally deaf subjects show enhanced 
tactile sensitivity, in terms of tactile change detection, 
compared with controls, and Bottari and others (2010) 
have recently reported enhanced reactivity to visual stim-
uli in deaf individuals. Bavelier and others (2006) reviewed 
research pointing to enhancement in visual processing in 
the deaf. Deaf signers are better at distributing attention 
toward the visual periphery during certain visual perception 
tasks than both sighted–hearing controls and hearing sign-
ers (Bavelier and others 2000; Bosworth and Dobkins 
2002; Neville and Lawson 1987; Proksch and Bavelier 
2002; Rettenbach and others 1999; Stevens and Neville 
2006). Further studies have shown enhancements, partic-
ularly lateralized to the right visual field, in visual motion 
detection thresholds in deaf signers as compared with 
hearing subjects (Finney and others 2003). Dye and others 
(2007) also reported enhancement of peripheral attention 
mechanisms in deaf subjects (as manifest in greater inter-
ference from peripheral flankers), and Dye and others 
(2009) also demonstrated enhanced visual selective atten-
tion within the peripheral visual field. In terms of mecha-
nisms that may underlie enhanced visual function in the 
deaf, a recent report (Codina and others 2011) has pointed 
to unique retinal changes in deaf individuals that were not 
found in hearing subjects. In a systematic study of the 
effects of long-term hearing loss, and also the ability to 
use sign language, Cattani and others (2007) reported that 
experience in sign language use was a key mechanism 
underlying the enhancement of visual abilities found in 
deaf subjects. In fact, different neural substrates may sup-
port the perception of American Sign Language compared 
with other actions (Corina and others 2007). Additionally, 
Rouger and others (2007) found better lip-reading perfor-
mance in deaf subjects, and also the enhanced ability to 
integrate visual and degraded speech cues during lip-
reading. Deaf subjects demonstrate superior performance 
in detecting emotional expression and local facial features 
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and discriminating between different faces (Arnold and 
Murray 1998; Bettger and others 1997; McCullough and 
Emmorey 1997) and show preserved or even enhanced 
ability for temporal processing and temporal order judg-
ments (Nava and others 2008). However, as in the case of 
blindness, not all aspects of non-hearing sensory process-
ing are enhanced or even maintained in deaf individuals, 
with impairments evident in some aspects of temporal 
attention (Dye and Bavelier 2010).
Creativity in  
Neurodegenerative Disease
Unexpectedly, new or preserved musical or visual artistic 
abilities have been described mainly in the setting of 
frontotemporal dementia, which causes progressive atro-
phy of frontal and anterior temporal lobes (Miller and 
others 1996; Miller and others 1998; Miller and others 
2000), though occasionally in other settings (Schott 
2012; Chakravarty 2011). Examples of such artistic pro-
ductivity are shown in Figures 4 and 5.
Given the putative role of the frontal lobes in creativ-
ity, it is not surprising that the emergence of these abili-
ties is more often linked to degeneration of the anterior 
temporal lobe, particularly in the left hemisphere, and 
that artistic creativity may be at the cost of some impair-
ments in cognition. These patients may show progressive 
loss of conceptual knowledge, and their creative output 
tends to be devoid of verbal or symbolic content (Miller 
and others 2000); patients paint realistic landscapes, ani-
mals, or detailed geometric designs devoid of meaning 
beyond the literal. Musicians continue to perform music 
but, even with popular songs, pay less attention to the 
words. One individual did not notice when the words of a 
famous folk song, My Bonny Lies Over the Ocean, were 
altered to the point of being incomprehensible during a 
sing-a-long (Sacks 2007). In our experience, much of the 
work created by these patients contains some recollec-
tions from the past; though, as mentioned above, they 
tend to avoid verbal or symbolic representations. Not sur-
prisingly, then, a recent study restricted to patients with 
the frontal variant of frontotemporal lobar degeneration 
Figure 4. Evolution of artwork in a patient with progressive non-fluent aphasia. A was painted in 1990, whereas B was 
painted in 2000 and demonstrates a move away from realistic depictions and toward more abstract art. The patient began 
showing symptoms in the late 1990s. Reprinted with the family’s permission.
Figure 5. Sculpture by a patient with frontotemporal 
dementia, 2 years after diagnosis. This patient showed no 
interest in art prior to the onset of his disease and with 
disease progression became more and more obsessed with 
art creation. Reprinted with the family’s permission.
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demonstrated a marked impairment on the Torrance Test 
of Creative Thinking in this patient group, compared with 
healthy controls and patients with Parkinson’s disease (de 
Souza and others 2010).
Despite progressive neurodegeneration, these artistic 
patients share many features with great creative minds 
from history. They can show increasing interest and/or 
preoccupation with their subjects, neglect social and 
occupational responsibilities in favour of their art, and 
they continue to produce work even in the absence of any 
encouragement or support from others (Miller and others 
1998). It is likely that within their artistic context, they 
are able to achieve a “rewarding state of flow.” “Flow” 
was first defined by Mihalji Csikszentmihalyi (1991) to 
characterize those moments where an individual is so 
productively involved in an activity that he or she is 
almost in a meditative state and does not notice the pass-
ing of time—the individual is absorbed in and enjoys 
something to such an extent that he or she becomes less 
distractible and more effective. As suggested earlier, 
patients with emergence of new or preservation of old 
artistic skills do not show extensive frontal lobe degen-
eration (Miller and others 2000). This fits with a wealth 
of research on creativity in neurologically intact individu-
als, which suggests that certain components of frontal 
lobe function are critical (Chavez-Eakle and others 2007).
While exploring the connection between anterior tem-
poral lobe degeneration and visual art, Rankin and col-
leagues (2007) used standardized tests to probe creative 
cognition and novel tests of visual art creation. Patients 
with both the frontal and temporal variants of frontotem-
poral dementia produced artwork that was rated as more 
bizarre and distorted than patients with Alzheimer’s dis-
ease and healthy age-matched controls. Notably, however, 
in the verbal tests of creative cognition, patients with 
semantic dementia (anterior temporal lobe damage) 
showed decreased fluency, originality, and elaboration in 
concert with a tendency toward ending the test prema-
turely. On standardized visuospatial creativity testing, 
which involved creating drawings based on incomplete 
meaningless doodles, these patients were more likely than 
participants from any of the other groups to produce draw-
ings devoid of meaning, and to choose conventional or 
obvious markings, such as closing an open-ended figure. 
In contrast, their paintings, and other artwork were strik-
ing in the aesthetic dimension, characterized by the 
unorthodox use of vivid and unconventional colors, intri-
cate and repetitive geometrical designs, underscoring the 
unique perception and also the obsessive nature of their 
work. One caveat when interpreting this work is that 
though the patients’ drawings might be hailed as more cre-
ative by the artistic community, the brain networks under-
lying this may not be the same as that used by healthy 
artists; it is one thing to be able to represent an object 
realistically and then steer away from this for artistic 
effect, quite another to be no longer able to hold accurate 
representations. The enhancements in creativity with a 
particular degenerative pattern may also be domain spe-
cific. Skills in one domain, for example, music, may 
improve creative output in that domain but not necessar-
ily transfer to other artistic realms, so too might the para-
doxical facilitation of creativity with neurological disease 
remain tied to a single output.
The dominance of the visual, and the perseverative or 
obsessive behaviors characteristic of semantic dementia, 
is reflected in the large proportion (~25%) of these patients 
for whom jigsaw puzzles become important, or even the 
primary activity of daily living (Green and Patterson 2009), 
suggesting they are able to achieve “flow” during working 
on these puzzles. In a controlled study, Green and Patterson 
(2009) found that semantic dementia patients have above 
average jigsaw skills, especially in “reality-disrupted” puz-
zles, in which expectations of the real world can interfere 
with puzzle completion, and in “grain” jigsaw puzzles, 
characterized by the fact that conceptual knowledge does 
not benefit performance. Encouragingly, from a clinical 
standpoint, semantic dementia patients, who often exhibit 
flat affect and demeanor in social situations, displayed 
pleasure and pride during the completion of jigsaw puz-
zles suggesting that this might be a good candidate for 
enabling flow in many patients with semantic dementia.
In a comprehensive case study, Seeley and others 
(2008) described a visual artist, Anne Adams, with pro-
gressive non-fluent aphasia (PNFA). Though she had 
painted as a hobby throughout her life, with disease pro-
gression painting became progressively more important, 
until it became her primary daily activity. Note that she 
might have chosen any number of hobbies that were less 
complex, or related to her profession (she was a biologist), 
and yet she, and other similar patients, chose visual art. 
Likewise, another semantic dementia patient who was a 
lawyer by profession and a musician by avocation also 
chose to produce visual art when he became ill, rather than 
resorting to music or other hobbies (Miller and others 
1998). Anne’s most stunning works were produced at a 
time when the disease was already progressing. In PNFA, 
the main site of atrophy is the left fronto-opercular cortex, 
leaving patients with effortful, non-fluent, and apractic 
speech (Gorno-Tempini and others 2004), together with 
difficulties with grammar and articulation. In an interest-
ing twist of fate, Anne created an elaborate painting 
inspired by Maurice Ravel’s (1875–1937) famous 
“Bolero” (Seeley and others 2008). Ravel himself suffered 
from a progressive aphasia, and composed this, set to 
the rhythms of the Moorish-Spanish dance, in the early 
stages of his disease, at age 53. The piece is a study of 
compulsions and perseverations (Amaducci and others 
2002), with the repetition of a simple melodic theme, 
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accompanied by an extraordinarily repetitive and simple 
bass line. Interestingly, Ravel considered the Bolero as a 
rather trivial work, describing it once as “a piece for 
orchestra without music.” “I’m going to try and repeat 
[the theme] a number of times without any development, 
gradually increasing the orchestra as best I can” (Orenstein, 
1991). After writing Bolero, Ravel’s illness gradually pro-
gressed until he died 8 years later, of iatrogenic complica-
tions. Unaware of Ravel’s illness, Anne Adams painted 
her Bolero, in a precise and compulsive fashion, with the 
height of each of her rows signifying the increasing tex-
ture and volume of the orchestra. Although her PNFA may 
have reduced social interaction, she was evidently still 
able to transfer descriptive content from one medium to 
another.
Structural and functional imaging demonstrated 
enhanced gray matter and activation in heteromodal asso-
ciative (intraparietal sulcus/superior parietal lobule) and 
polymodal (superior temporal sulcus) neocortex in Anne’s 
right hemisphere (Seeley and others 2008). These areas 
are involved in visuomotor search and attentional control 
(Corbetta and Shulman 2002; Seeley and others 2007) 
and sensory transcoding, necessary for sight-reading 
music (Schon and others 2002; Sergent and others 1992). 
Voxel-based morphometry (VBM) has also demon-
strated enhancement in these same regions in profes-
sional musicians (Gaser and Schlaug 2003).
Given that patients with semantic dementia seem to 
prefer tasks that engage their visual processing skills, 
such as jigsaw puzzles, gardening, playing solitaire, and 
other activities, Viskontas and others (2007) wondered 
whether they experience the visual world differently as 
their disease progresses. In a preliminary investigation of 
what aspects of the visual field draw their attention, the 
authors tracked eye movements in healthy age-matched 
controls, patients with Alzheimer’s disease, frontal vari-
ant frontotemporal dementia, as well as semantic demen-
tia as they freely observed images of various objects, 
landscapes, and artwork. To interpret the eye movement 
data, heat-map density plots from each patient group 
were compared with maps from healthy control partici-
pants. There was very little overlap between where the 
semantic dementia patients spend their time looking and 
what draws the attention of healthy participants, and 
other patient groups. These findings suggested that these 
patients do indeed pay attention to aspects of the visual 
field that are largely ignored by healthy people.
Viskontas and others (2011) have recently completed a 
study of dementia patients that found enhanced visual 
search in patients with semantic dementia, which in turn 
correlated with greater grey matter in the right superior 
parietal lobe in both patients and controls when measured 
with VBM (Figures 6 and 7). That is to say, the more grey 
matter found in this region, the better the performance in 
conjunction search.
In addition, Gansler and others (2011) have reported 
VBM data from the figural subtest of the Torrance Test of 
Creative Thinking, showing that an increase in gray mat-
ter in a region of the right parietal lobe correlates with 
Figure 6. Sample trial for conjunction search task used by 
Viskontas and others (2011). Instructions were to indicate 
whether there is a green “N” in the display. Note that serial 
search of each item is required to complete the task.
Figure 7. Mean response time performance on conjunction 
search task by healthy controls and patients with semantic 
dementia. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
Note that semantic dementia patients were faster than 
control participants in the most difficult condition (target 
embedded among 30 distractors).
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divergent reasoning and visuospatial processing. The 
enhancement of function in the right posterior brain may 
account for the increase in focused visuospatially based 
activities in these patients, whether in jigsaw puzzles, the 
design of beautiful gardens, or the creation of visual art. 
This alteration in visual search may be one mechanism by 
which patients with semantic dementia create paintings 
with vivid and repetitive geometric patterns.
Positive Aspects  
of Cognitive Aging
On 15 January 2009, Captain Chesley Sullenberger suc-
cessfully landed an engineless plane in the Hudson River, 
New York and in doing so saved the lives of all 154 people 
aboard the plane (Figure 8). Similar dramatic rescues of 
crippled aircraft have occurred over the years and most of 
these events have had one thing in common: A highly 
experienced pilot was flying the plane. There was a gen-
eral consensus among professional pilots that it was the 
training and experience of the pilots in these incidents that 
enabled them to respond correctly to the extreme chal-
lenges that they encountered. Each of these pilots, like 
Captain Chesley Sullenberger, was close to 60 years old, 
an age at which airline pilots prior to 2007 were required 
to retire in the United States, and an age that the cognitive 
gerontology literature might classify as “old.”
How are we to reconcile the dramatic skills of airline 
pilots such as these with a behavioral and neuropsycho-
logical literature reporting declines in cognitive function-
ing? To address this question, we review paradoxical 
evidence showing that, relative to young adults, older 
adults show spared (and occasionally even superior) cog-
nitive functioning.
Memory Functioning
Although complaints about failing memory skills are 
widespread among older adults, and empirical work sup-
ports these observations (see Balota and others 2000; 
Craik 2002 for reviews), not all memory functions are 
impaired or, at least, not all are equally impaired. For 
example, impairments are typically greater in recall tasks 
than in recognition tasks (e.g., Craik and McDowd 1987; 
Nyberg and others 2003; Schonfield and Robertson 
1966). And although memory for specific events may 
decline whenever recall is required, semantic memory 
remains intact or even improves with age across the adult 
lifespan, likely reflecting accumulated knowledge about 
words, facts and events (Goldberg 2005; Nyberg and oth-
ers 2003).
Furthermore, unintentional or implicit memory (when 
retrieval is triggered by a cue without one’s knowledge or 
awareness) also shows quite a different pattern from 
intentional recall, with older adults usually showing pre-
served performance (see Ballesteros and others 2009; 
Jennings and Jacoby 1993; Light and others 2000). In fact, 
if anything, older adults tend to rely on implicit memory 
or contextually driven, automatic retrieval (e.g., Spieler 
and others 2006). For example, Rowe and others (2006) 
showed that older adults implicitly acquire information in 
one situation and tacitly use it in another, resulting in 
superior performance in the second situation by older, as 
compared with younger, adults (see also Kim and Hasher 
2005). Recent work suggests that healthy older adults 
learn from and use distraction from one situation to aid 
their performance in other situations, including those that 
involve reducing and eliminating forgetting (Biss and oth-
ers, in press; Campbell and others 2010). These spared 
implicit memory and tacit learning processes may enable 
older adults to perform well on such complex tasks as 
emotional regulation and decision making.
Emotional Regulation
Older adults tend to outperform young adults in emotional 
regulation (Charles and Carstensen 2010). Compared 
with younger adults, older adults report being less likely 
to engage in negative conflict with others (Birditt and 
Fingerman 2005) and they show greater wisdom when 
presented with interpersonal and international conflict 
scenarios (Grossmann and others 2010). They are also 
more effective at solving hypothetical interpersonal prob-
lems (see Blanchard-Fields and others 2007; see also the 
wisdom work of Baltes and colleagues, e.g., Baltes and 
Smith 2008). Indeed, across all education, social class, 
and IQ levels (in a US sample), greater age is associated 
with greater wisdom in both interpersonal and societal 
conflict domains (Grossmann and others 2010). Still 
Figure 8. Captain Chesley Sullenberger and the downed US 
Airways plane in Hudson River, New York. Reproduced by 
permission.
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another facet of the social and affective wisdom of older 
adults can be seen in story telling situations in which 
older adults tend to be more responsive to their audi-
ences, whether young children (Adams and others 2002) 
or other older adults (Sullivan and others 2010) than are 
young adults.
Problem Solving and Decision Making
Whatever declines there may be in memory performance 
with age do not translate directly into impairments in 
everyday problem solving (e.g., Healey and Hasher 2009). 
Indeed, there are a number of findings showing preserved 
or enhanced decision-making abilities (Worthy and others 
2011). For example, older adults seem to be less suscepti-
ble to classic decision biases than younger adults. Consider 
the “sunk-cost fallacy,” or the tendency to continue with an 
action once an investment has been made, whether in time 
or money. This has been widely reported among young 
adults but is far less prevalent among older adults (see 
Strough and others 2008). There is also evidence of older 
adults making reliably more rational choices compared to 
college students (Kim and Hasher 2005; Tentori and others 
2001). As well, older adults appear to use all the informa-
tion occurring in one situation—whether relevant or not—
to solve problems in another situation (Kim and others 
2007). Younger adults, by contrast, seem only to have 
access to the initially relevant information, leaving them 
impaired should initially irrelevant information become 
useful (Healey and others 2008).
The greater problem solving and decision making skills 
of older adults may stem from a number of different factors 
including of course greater accumulated knowledge. They 
are also likely to have greater knowledge about their own 
goals, values, and priorities (see Kim and others 2008). 
Alternatively, or in addition, older adults’ reliance on auto-
matic, intuitive processes may enable them to succeed 
whenever intuitive or heuristic processing yields effective 
solutions (e.g., Gigerenzer and Selten 2001).
Conclusions
Contemporary neuroscience sees the brain as a non-linear 
device, which relies on dynamic synchrony and balance 
between neural systems. Damage to the brain may 
upset this dynamic state, and repair may often entail 
interventions that restore a degree of synchrony and bal-
ance. Without playing down the very real losses that 
often arise, the paradoxical enhancements noted in 
this article emphasize the importance of looking at 
change rather than simply focusing on deficit. This focus 
echoes a broader approach seen in the fields of positive 
psychology and positive clinical psychology that places 
emphasis on dispositional optimism, flourishing, resil-
ience, and functional reserve in coping with impairment 
(Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi 2000; Wood and Tarrier 
2010). The emerging fields of “positive neurology” and 
“positive neuropsychology” have a similar focus, with 
concepts such as resilience having a greater focus over 
the past few years (see http://www.posneuroscience.org). 
These fields point to a greater emphasis on intact skills, 
on past strengths and interests, and on how both rehabili-
tation efforts and domestic, social and work environ-
ments can be altered to take these skills and talents into 
account. Our approach is, in parallel, seeking out exam-
ples where function of itself may be improved after brain 
lesions. These paradoxical phenomena may not only 
open up novel ways of assisting patients but also provide 
fresh insights into the functioning of the normal human 
brain (Kapur 2011).
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